Suppose there are 3 alternatives , and ; and four individuals 1, 2, 3 and 4. The individuals' rankings (orderings) of the three alternatives, , are given by (Notation : Alternatives inside the parentheses are indifferent to each other. If an alternative is written to the left of another alternative, then the former is preferred to the latter.) Then the set of Pareto-optimal alternatives is
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Suppose there are 3 alternatives x, y and z; and four individuals 1, 2, 3 and 4. The individuals' rankings (orderings) of the three alternatives, Rᵢ, i = 1, ⋯, 4 are given by R₁: (xy)z R₂: yzx R₃: z(xy) R₄: (xy)z (*Notation*: Alternatives inside the parentheses are indifferent to each other. If an alternative is written to the left of another alternative, then the former is preferred to the latter.) Then the set of Pareto-optimal alternatives is (A) {x, y} (B) {x, z} (C) {y, z} (D) None of the above
Also written as: Suppose there are 3 alternatives x, y and z; and four individuals 1, 2, 3 and 4. The individuals' rankings (orderings) of the three alternatives, R_i, i = 1,..., 4 are given by R_1: (xy)z R_2: yzx R_3: z(xy) R_4: (xy)z (*Notation*: Alternatives inside the parentheses are indifferent to each other. If an alternative is written to the left of another alternative, then the former is preferred to the latter.) Then the set of Pareto-optimal alternatives is
Welfare economics and social choice has come up 62 times in 6 exams since 2004.
This question is on Pareto efficiency and Pareto improvements, part of Welfare economics and social choice in Microeconomics.
What it means for an allocation to be efficient, checked in exchange economies and other settings.
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Question from the JNU SSS 2011 paper. Solutions are TestStop's own. Not affiliated with or endorsed by any examination authority.