Can a market of selfish people produce a good outcome, and what does “good” mean? This module answers with one picture, the Edgeworth box, and builds up to the two welfare theorems, social welfare functions and Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Each lesson has a lab to move, and 128 past-paper questions sorted by level finish it.
Which splits of the goods are efficient, and which one do prices pick?
When does competition give an efficient economy, and what does fairness have to do with it?
How do we rank efficient outcomes, and what does the DSE entrance ask in the same topics?
One question from each lesson. Your first wrong answer tells you where to begin; get them all and you can go straight to the cheat sheet.
At a point in the Edgeworth box, person 1's MRS is 3 and person 2's is 1. Then
What each idea says, who gave it and when, how to use it, and the trap examiners set on it.
UGC NET and CUET put these in order or match them to names. The dates are from the original publications; the Sources chapter lists where we checked them.
| Year | Contribution |
|---|---|
| 1874 | Walras, Éléments d'économie politique pure: general equilibrium and the auctioneer |
| 1881 | Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics: the contract curve and the range of final settlements |
| 1906 | Pareto, Manuale di economia politica: Pareto optimality (French edition 1909) |
| 1938 | Bergson: the social welfare function |
| 1939 | Kaldor and Hicks: the compensation criterion |
| 1941 | Scitovsky: the double criterion and the paradox |
| 1950–51 | Arrow: the impossibility theorem; Arrow and Debreu: the two welfare theorems (1951) |
| 1954 | Arrow and Debreu: existence of competitive equilibrium |
| 1971 | Rawls: A Theory of Justice and the maximin principle |
The Delhi School asks more here than all the other exams together, in a distinctive style: strange tastes and an economy to solve. JAM and GATE set the numerical equilibrium problems. CUET, UGC NET and Hyderabad ask definitions, Walras’ law, the welfare theorems and who-said-what.
Definitions and who-said-what: Pareto efficiency, the contract curve, Walras' law and the welfare theorems. Most CUET, UGC NET and Hyderabad questions sit here.
Statements to judge, matching lists, and equilibrium prices and bundles to compute with Cobb–Douglas and Leontief tastes, up to JAM, GATE and JNU level.
The Delhi School of Economics' exchange-economy questions, collected in Lesson 6.
These are questions from the TestStop bank. A free account answers 10 a day, each with its worked solution; All-Access opens every set with no daily limit.
A rectangle that shows every way two people can split fixed amounts of two goods. Its width is the total of the first good and its height the total of the second. Person 1 measures her bundle from the bottom-left corner, person 2 from the top-right, so every point is one allocation of everything. It is used to find Pareto efficient allocations (the contract curve) and, with prices, competitive equilibrium.
The set of all Pareto efficient allocations in the Edgeworth box: the points where the two people's indifference curves are tangent, so their marginal rates of substitution are equal. From any point off the curve there is a trade that helps both. With kinked or non-convex tastes the efficient set can be a band or lie on the edges of the box.
The value of the aggregate excess demand across all markets is zero at every price vector, because each person spends exactly her wealth. So if N − 1 markets are in equilibrium the Nth is too, and only N − 1 relative prices need to be solved for.
The first: every competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient (it needs price-taking, no externalities and nonsatiation, but not convexity). The second: with convex preferences and production sets, every Pareto efficient allocation is a competitive equilibrium after a suitable lump-sum redistribution of endowments, so efficiency and distribution can be separated.
Compensation tests for a change that makes some people better off and others worse off. Kaldor (1939): the gainers could compensate the losers and still be better off. Hicks (1939): the losers could not profitably bribe the gainers to forgo the change. Scitovsky (1941): the move must pass the Kaldor test and the move back must fail it, which rules out the paradox where each position appears better than the other.
With at least three alternatives, no way of combining individual rankings into a social ranking satisfies unrestricted domain, the Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship at once. Majority rule, for example, can cycle (the Condorcet paradox). Arrow published it in 1950 and in his 1951 book Social Choice and Individual Values.
The dates and attributions above were checked against the pages below on 24 October 2026. Where historians disagree we say so: the modern Edgeworth box diagram is credited to Pareto’s Manuale (1906) in most textbooks, though Edgeworth’s 1881 analysis came first and the attribution is debated. Every answer key in the practice sets was worked by hand against the key. Questions whose keys we think are wrong, or whose stored text cannot be solved, are left out; the reasons are given on the lesson pages and in the module’s source file.