Player 1 moves first and chooses or . If she plays , the game ends with payoffs . If she plays , player 2 chooses or ; if , the game ends with ; if , player 1 then chooses or , with giving and giving . This game
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Player 1 moves first and chooses or . If she plays , the game ends with payoffs . If she plays , player 2 chooses or ; if , the game ends with ; if , player 1 then chooses or , with giving and giving . This game
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Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If she plays R, the game ends with payoffs (10, 0). If she plays L, player 2 chooses L or R; if R, the game ends with (0, 20); if L, player 1 then chooses L or R, with L giving (30, 30) and R giving (40, 0). This game (A) has three subgame perfect equilibria (B) has a unique Nash equilibrium (C) has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which 2 plays L (D) has a unique Nash equilibrium outcome
Game theory and strategic behaviour has come up 61 times in 6 exams since 2008.
This question is on Extensive-form games and backward induction, part of Game theory and strategic behaviour in Game Theory.
Games played in sequence, solved from the end back to the start.
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Question from the DSE 2018 paper. Solutions are TestStop's own. Not affiliated with or endorsed by any examination authority.