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Questions › DSE › DSE 2013 › Q34
2 marksMicroeconomics › Welfare economics and social choice › Social welfare functions and social choiceHardabout 3 min

DSE 2013 Question 34: Welfare economics and social choice

In a two-person two-good exchange economy, agents are A and B and goods are 1 and 2, with utilities uA(x1,x2)=αx1+x2u_A(x_1,x_2)=\alpha x_1+x_2uA​(x1​,x2​)=αx1​+x2​ and uB(y1,y2)=y1y2u_B(y_1,y_2)=y_1y_2uB​(y1​,y2​)=y1​y2​. There are 5 units of each good (x1+y1=5x_1+y_1=5x1​+y1​=5, x2+y2=5x_2+y_2=5x2​+y2​=5). Consider the allocation in which A gets 4 units of good 1 only, and B gets 1 unit of good 1 and 5 units of good 2.

Suppose an agent iii is said to envy agent jjj if iii strictly prefers jjj's allocation over her own, and an allocation is a 'No-envy allocation' if neither agent envies the other. In that case:

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In a two-person two-good exchange economy, agents are A and B and goods are 1 and 2, with utilities u_A(x₁,x₂)=α x₁+x₂ and u_B(y₁,y₂)=y₁y₂. There are 5 units of each good (x₁+y₁=5, x₂+y₂=5). Consider the allocation in which A gets 4 units of good 1 only, and B gets 1 unit of good 1 and 5 units of good 2. Suppose an agent i is said to envy agent j if i strictly prefers j 's allocation over her own, and an allocation is a 'No-envy allocation' if neither agent envies the other. In that case: (A) the above allocation is always a No-envy allocation (B) the above allocation is never a No-envy allocation (C) the above allocation is a No-envy allocation if α≥ 5/3 (D) the above allocation is a No-envy allocation if α≤ 3/5

Also written as: In a two-person two-good exchange economy, agents are A and B and goods are 1 and 2, with utilities u_A(x_1,x_2)=alpha x_1+x_2 and u_B(y_1,y_2)=y_1y_2. There are 5 units of each good (x_1+y_1=5, x_2+y_2=5). Consider the allocation in which A gets 4 units of good 1 only, and B gets 1 unit of good 1 and 5 units of good 2. Suppose an agent i is said to envy agent j if i strictly prefers j 's allocation over her own, and an allocation is a 'No-envy allocation' if neither agent envies the other. In that case:

Welfare economics and social choice has come up 62 times in 6 exams since 2004.

What this question tests

This question is on Social welfare functions and social choice, part of Welfare economics and social choice in Microeconomics.

Combining individual preferences into social judgements, and the limits of doing so.

TestStop has 8 past-paper questions on this subtopic.

Practise Welfare economics and social choiceMore on Social welfare functions and social choice

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Question from the DSE 2013 paper. Solutions are TestStop's own. Not affiliated with or endorsed by any examination authority.