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Questions › DSE › DSE 2011 › Q50
2 marksGame Theory › Game theory and strategic behaviour › Extensive-form games and backward inductionHardabout 4 min

DSE 2011 Question 50: Game theory and strategic behaviour

Consider two games in strategic form. Game 1: the row player chooses Enter or Not enter and the column player's only option is Hawk, with payoffs (row, column) Enter =(−1,1)=(-1,1)=(−1,1), Not enter =(0,6)=(0,6)=(0,6). Game 2 adds a Dove column: Enter === Hawk (−1,1)(-1,1)(−1,1), Dove (3,3)(3,3)(3,3); Not enter === Hawk (0,6)(0,6)(0,6), Dove (0,7)(0,7)(0,7). Compute the Nash equilibria of the two games. What general lesson can be drawn?

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Consider two games in strategic form. Game 1: the row player chooses Enter or Not enter and the column player's only option is Hawk, with payoffs (row, column) Enter =(-1,1), Not enter =(0,6). Game 2 adds a Dove column: Enter = Hawk (-1,1), Dove (3,3); Not enter = Hawk (0,6), Dove (0,7). Compute the Nash equilibria of the two games. What general lesson can be drawn? (A) Eliminating a strategic option may be beneficial. (B) Having extra strategic options is not beneficial. (C) Having extra strategic options is beneficial. (D) Eliminating a strategic option is beneficial.

Game theory and strategic behaviour has come up 61 times in 6 exams since 2008.

What this question tests

This question is on Extensive-form games and backward induction, part of Game theory and strategic behaviour in Game Theory.

Games played in sequence, solved from the end back to the start.

TestStop has 16 past-paper questions on this subtopic.

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Question from the DSE 2011 paper. Solutions are TestStop's own. Not affiliated with or endorsed by any examination authority.