DSE 2005 Question 4: Welfare economics and social choice
For the exchange economy with Agent 1 endowment (100,100) maximizing min{x1,y1} and Agent 2 endowment (50,0) maximizing x2+y2: suppose the government imposes a lump-sum tax of Rs. 50 on agent 1 and transfers the receipts as a lump-sum subsidy of Rs. 50 to agent 2. After this wealth transfer, an example of a competitive equilibrium is: prices (p1,p2)=(1/2,1/2) and allocation
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For the exchange economy with Agent 1 endowment (100,100) maximizing min {x₁,y₁} and Agent 2 endowment (50,0) maximizing x₂+y₂: suppose the government imposes a lump-sum tax of Rs. 50 on agent 1 and transfers the receipts as a lump-sum subsidy of Rs. 50 to agent 2. After this wealth transfer, an example of a competitive equilibrium is: prices (p₁,p₂)=(1/2,1/2) and allocation (A) (x₁,y₁)=(100,100) and (x₂,y₂)=(50,0) (B) (x₁,y₁)=(50,50) and (x₂,y₂)=(100,50) (C) (x₁,y₁)=(0,100) and (x₂,y₂)=(150,0) (D) (x₁,y₁)=(100,0) and (x₂,y₂)=(50,100)
Also written as: For the exchange economy with Agent 1 endowment (100,100) maximizing min {x_1,y_1} and Agent 2 endowment (50,0) maximizing x_2+y_2: suppose the government imposes a lump-sum tax of Rs. 50 on agent 1 and transfers the receipts as a lump-sum subsidy of Rs. 50 to agent 2. After this wealth transfer, an example of a competitive equilibrium is: prices (p_1,p_2)=(1/2,1/2) and allocation
Welfare economics and social choice has come up 62 times in 6 exams since 2004.
What this question tests
This question is on The fundamental theorems of welfare economics, part of Welfare economics and social choice in Microeconomics.
When competitive markets deliver efficient outcomes and how transfers can reach any efficient outcome.
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