Almost every reform since 1991 began as a committee report. The papers test them three ways: who chaired it, when, and the one thing it recommended. Here are all of them in order, with the two Narasimham committees and the two big tax committees taken apart properly.
Banking and monetary committees run down the left, tax committees down the right, in the order they were set up. The must-knows show first; tick Show all for the minor ones papers occasionally slip into a match-the-list. Open any row for what it recommended.
Examine the structure, organisation, functions and procedures of the financial system.
Bank nationalisation in July 1969 worked on the numbers it was meant to move. By 1991 rural deposits had risen from 3% to 15% of all deposits, priority sector credit from 14% to 41% of bank credit, and borrowal accounts from barely 4 lakh to over 3.5 crore. But productivity, asset quality and profits had collapsed. Narasimham I blamed two things above all: directed investment and directed credit.
In 1991 CRR sat at its statutory maximum of 15% and SLR at 38.5%: more than half of every deposit went to the RBI or to government paper, mostly at below-market interest. Narasimham called high SLR a tax on the banking system.
SLR and CRR locked up 53.5% of deposits, earning less than banks paid their depositors. The Committee called high SLR a tax on the banking system.
Lending to priority sectors at concessional rates, often without proper appraisal. It found about 20% of agricultural and small-industry credit “contaminated”.
Loan melas and government-prepared borrower lists: “socially oriented credit… degenerated into irresponsible lending”.
Branches opened without regard to viability, over-staffing, and pay unrelated to productivity.
A bank's resources come from the public and are held in trust; they must be deployed for the depositors' benefit. So even the Government has no business endangering a bank's solvency for planning or social goals.
Despite opposition from bank unions and parties, it accepted the major recommendations: SLR to 25% by October 1997, CRR to 5.5% by December 2001, interest rate slabs cut from 20 to 2 by 1994–95, and deposit rates decontrolled.
The cut in priority sector lending from 40% to 10% was not accepted; the Narasimham II report itself records this. The Finance Ministry's Banking Division, which two members wanted closed, stayed.
Asked to “review the progress of banking sector reforms to date and chart a programme on financial sector reforms necessary to strengthen India's financial system and make it internationally competitive.” The backdrop was capital account convertibility: large flows in and out would need a much stronger banking system.
Barring narrow banking and the rejection of strong-weak mergers, the book quotes one critic, the 1998 report was “like watching an action replay of the earlier report.”
| Narasimham I | Narasimham II | |
|---|---|---|
| Official name | Committee on the Financial System | Committee on Banking Sector Reforms |
| Report | November 1991 | April 1998 |
| Theme in exams | Financial sector reform | Banking sector reform |
| Capital adequacy | 8%, in stages | 9% by 2000, 10% by 2002 |
| Bad loans | Asset Reconstruction Fund | Asset Reconstruction Company; net NPAs to 3% by 2002 |
| Directed credit | Priority sector to 10% | Keep 40%; end interest subsidy |
| Structure | 3–4 international, 8–10 national, local, rural banks | Merge strong banks; narrow banking for weak ones |
| Ownership | Autonomy; no more nationalisation | Government stake down to 33% |
| Reserves | SLR 38.5% → 25%; CRR 15% → 3–5% | (builds on I) |
I = 1991 = Financial system (SLR, CRR, directed credit, interest rates). II = 1998 = Banking sector (capital adequacy, NPAs, mergers, narrow banking). The same M. Narasimham also chaired the 1975 working group that led to Regional Rural Banks.
Indian tax reform has swung in two big arcs. Up to the 1970s policy piled on taxes and near-confiscatory rates to fund the Plans, and the committees of that era either added taxes (Kaldor) or fought the evasion that high rates bred (Wanchoo). From 1991 they cut rates, widened the base and simplified. Read the ladder top to bottom: the questions usually ask for the order.
The interim report set out the principles and applied them to income and wealth taxes, tariffs and domestic consumption taxes. The final report dealt with administration and enforcement, and then with restructuring tariffs. The aim was to be revenue-neutral in the short run and raise revenue productivity in the long run: broaden the base, lower marginal rates, reduce rate differentiation, simplify.
Chelliah also argued that tax sharing forced the Centre to lean on non-shareable taxes, and suggested states get a fixed share of the Centre's aggregate revenue. The Finance Ministry asked the 10th Finance Commission to examine the idea, which led to the 80th Amendment. See the Finance Commissions guide.
Both Centre and states would get concurrent power to levy GST, which needed a constitutional amendment, and it would replace cascading taxes such as central sales tax, octroi and entry tax. Most goods would bear the standard 20%. The book's criticism: the income tax slabs gave little relief at the bottom and much more at the top, an “inverted equity principle”.
Where a year could not be confirmed from a source, the page says so instead of guessing.
From UGC NET, IIT JAM, CUET-PG and the University of Hyderabad: Narasimham I and II, the chronology questions, Chelliah, Kelkar, Chakravarty and Urjit Patel.
These are questions from the TestStop bank. A free account answers 10 a day, each with its worked solution; All-Access opens every set with no daily limit.