Plain-text version
Two players A and B are playing a game. Player A has two available actions a₁ and a₂. Player B has two available actions b₁ and b₂. The payoff matrix arising from their actions is presented below. | b₁ | b₂ | a₁ | -1, 3 | 4, -1 | a₂ | 3, -4 | -2, 2 | Let p be the probability that player A plays action a₁ in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. Then the value of p is (round off to one decimal place)
Also written as: Two players A and B are playing a game. Player A has two available actions a_1 and a_2. Player B has two available actions b_1 and b_2. The payoff matrix arising from their actions is presented below. | b_1 | b_2 | a_1 | -1, 3 | 4, -1 | a_2 | 3, -4 | -2, 2 | Let p be the probability that player A plays action a_1 in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. Then the value of p is (round off to one decimal place)
Game theory and strategic behaviour has come up 61 times in 6 exams since 2008.
What this question tests
This question is on Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, part of Game theory and strategic behaviour in Game Theory.
Equilibria where players randomise, found by making the opponent indifferent.
TestStop has 5 past-paper questions on this subtopic.
Question from the GATE 2025 paper. Solutions are TestStop's own. Not affiliated with or endorsed by any examination authority.