Firm i's profit: πi=(a−Q)qi−cqi, where Q=∑qj. FOC with respect to qi (treating rivals' outputs as given): a−Q−qi−c=0.
By symmetry, all n firms produce the same quantity q∗, so Q=nq∗. Substituting:
a−nq∗−q∗−c=0⇒(n+1)q∗=a−c⇒q∗=n+1a−c
Total output: Q∗=nq∗=n+1n(a−c).
Equilibrium price:
P∗=a−Q∗=a−n+1n(a−c)=n+1a(n+1)−n(a−c)=n+1an+a−na+nc=n+1a+nc
=n+1a+n+1nc
This matches option (B) exactly.