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Questions › DSE › DSE 2020 › Q22
4 marks, −1Game Theory › Game theory and strategic behaviour › Extensive-form games and backward inductionModerateabout 3 min

DSE 2020 Question 22: Game theory and strategic behaviour

For the same game (player 111 chooses LLL/RRR; L→(1,0)L\to(1,0)L→(1,0); R→R\toR→ player 222 chooses U→(0,2)U\to(0,2)U→(0,2) or D→D\toD→ player 111 chooses L→(4,0)L\to(4,0)L→(4,0) or R→(3,3)R\to(3,3)R→(3,3)), the number of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is

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For the same game (player 1 chooses L / R; L→(1,0); R→ player 2 chooses U→(0,2) or D→ player 1 chooses L→(4,0) or R→(3,3)), the number of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is (A) one subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (B) two subgame perfect Nash equilibria (C) three subgame perfect Nash equilibria (D) no subgame perfect Nash equilibria

Also written as: For the same game (player 1 chooses L / R; L->(1,0); R-> player 2 chooses U->(0,2) or D-> player 1 chooses L->(4,0) or R->(3,3)), the number of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is

Game theory and strategic behaviour has come up 61 times in 6 exams since 2008.

What this question tests

This question is on Extensive-form games and backward induction, part of Game theory and strategic behaviour in Game Theory.

Games played in sequence, solved from the end back to the start.

TestStop has 16 past-paper questions on this subtopic.

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Question from the DSE 2020 paper. Solutions are TestStop's own. Not affiliated with or endorsed by any examination authority.